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Abstract 
Wireless networks are commonly used by people. Market devices are equipped with the new 
security standard 802.11i. The standard announced in the middle of 2004 is commonly used to 
protect WLANs. Currently we can find the information that vulnerabilities were found in that 
standard. Then a question arises: Are WLANs compromised again? The article describes 
vulnerabilities which were discovered in the new WLAN security standard. It explains how the 
four-way handshake process works. Which part of that process can be used to break through our 
network? What kind of devices should we possess to check that vulnerability? What kind of 
protection can be applied to avoid such vulnerability? 
 
1. Introduction 
Recently WLAN technologies have found an important place in LAN 
architecture. Low costs of implementation of WLANs caused the fact they are 
commonly used by large teams of people. Wireless networks are almost 
everywhere, some of them are unsecured. So there is not a big problem to then 
assign to 802.11 networks. Very often wireless networks are secured by WEP. 
Vulnerabilities of WEP protocol are very well described and even a person with 
minimal knowledge of WLANs can break that security. Very often unsecured 
and not configured the WLAN networks are common in cities. Such networks 
provide an easy way to read data sent by open WLANs and create possiblity of 
losing data. Some users can say that they do not have any valuable data and 
ability to lose so it is not a problem. Most of such users do not realize that 
opened networks provide possibilities to intruders to connect to the Internet. As 
a result of unsecuring the network or improper security can be less efficient 
network connection. That is why built in WLANs protections should be 
implemented. In the middle of 2004 the new security standard 802.11i was 
introduced. Wi-fi protected access (WPA) is the common name of new 802.11i 
standard. Then new standard ensured proper protection during the last two years. 
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But we can ask it 802.11i is still secure. Maybe there are some vulnerabilities in 
the new standard. If there are some, how can we protect against them? Finally 
how can we check the security level of our wireless network? This article 
describes vulnerabilities which where discovered in 802.11i during last years. 
Modern hardware is needed to check security level of WLAN. It describes 
hardware which can be used with open source tools to pass through WPA 
protected networks. The main aim of that article is to show that we should 
implement 802.11i standard properly. Avoid using dictionary words as pre-
shared keys at home WLANs.  
 
2. Hardware used to check wireless security 
The device used to connect to the wireless network is wireless card. There are 
some limitations hidden in the statement that almost every network card can be 
used for wireless hacking. The additional amount of time used during the 
process of setting up hardware to work in different operational modes is one of 
those limitations. Another are different grades of efficiency after that process. 
Precise technical reasons which improve the process of setting up device to work 
properly in different modes are client card sensitivity in dBm, client card 
chipset, client card power emission and consumption level, presence of external 
connector socket for additional antenna and the most important compatibility 
with the Unix systems. The first question asked by beginners is which model and  
manufacturer of wireless card is the best for wireless penetration. Chipsets used 
currently in wireless cards are described below. 
Card based on Prism chipset 
Client cards based on Prism I designed for 802.11, Prism II or Prism III 
designed for 802.11b, Prism Indigo designed for 802.11a or dual-band Prism GT 
working in 802.11b/g or Prism Duette working in 802.11a/b standard, Prism 
Nitro working in 802.11g standard are commonly used by large groups of 
hackers. The Intersil manufacturer of Prism chipsets makes board 
documentation, reference designs, applications notes and other technical papers 
available to people. That kind of chipset is possesed by the biggest set of drivers 
due to open documentation. Wlan-ng drivers available for Linux users include 
Jouni Malinen’s Hostap drivers – supporting the working client card in the 
Access Point mode. That kind of drivers can be used to set up honeypot or DoS 
and man-in-the-middle attack tests. Cards based on prism chipset support 
Abandon’s airjack drivers allowing frame manipulation and determining close 
networks SSIDs [1]. 
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Card based on Aironet chipset 
Cards equipped with Aironet chipset are based on Intersil Prism chipset. 
Cisco Inc. added some new functionalities during the process of chipset 
modification.  
The first additional Aironet card’s ability is a regulation of output transmit 
power. The second function is ability to hop over all ISM band channels without 
software hopper. Drivers support wide configuration in Microsoft Windows and 
Unix like operating systems. Chipset specification is proprietary and is different 
from Prism chipset that’s why host-ap drivers and Airjack drivers do not work 
properly. Nevertheless, users have got to use source code closed drivers supplied 
by Cisco cards equipped with that chipset which are excellent for rogue access 
point detection and multi channel traffic analysis [1]. 
 
Card based on Hermes chipset 
Development of that chipset is supported by Lucent ltd. Cards equipped with 
that chipset have good receiving sensivity. Drivers support Windows platform 
but binary Linux drivers are also available. Linux drivers based in orinoco_cs 
driver work under open source platform. Unfortunately, working in different 
modes is not supported by drivers. Setting up cards in the monitor mode requires 
patching original drivers. Another drawback is that HostAp drivers do not 
support cards equipped with that chipset [1]. 
 
Card based on Atheros chipset 
Cards based on Atheros AR5000 chipset work in 802.11a band. Linux drivers 
are available thanks to madwi-fi  and vantronix project. Cards working in 5GHz 
band are fully supported in Linux. Working in raw sniffing mode and packet 
injection is supported. Unfortunately, cards working in dual channel are not fully 
supported. It is possible to set up cards to work in the monitor mode but packet 
injection is not supported [1]. 
 
Card based on AMD chipset 
Another type of cards are AMDtek Inc chipset equipped. Cards equipped with 
that chipset work in 802.11 a/b/g combo cards. Although there are not many 
documents describing specification of AMD8211 chipset, manufacturer support 
Linux precompiled drivers [1]. 
 
Card based on other manufactures chipset 
Cards equipped with chipset of another vendor are supported by driverloader. 
Driverloader is the wrapper which allows windows drivers to be used under 
Linux. Another loader is Ndiswrapper which supports the same functionality. 
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 20:54:02
UM
CS
Ryszard Haraszczuk 410 
Unfortunately users have got to know that not all hacking functionality is 
available [1]. 
That paragraph describes different chipset types used in wireless cards. Some 
information about  functionality supported by these cards was characterized. The 
user has got to think which type of card he should possess to check wireless 
security. 
 
3. How does WPA-PSK work? 
An important thing used to connect to wireless network is appropriate 
network card. The person without knowledge of operation rules governing 
802.11i standard is unable to attack wireless network secured by that protection 
method. So let us look how new wireless security works.  
Standard 802.11i describes the process of connecting a new client to the 
network. That process is composed of: 
a) policy negotiation used for the process of authentication, 
b) process of authorization with one of the earlier negotiated methods. There 
are a few EAP types of authorization used, 
c) generation and distribution of keys. 
That standard contains a set of rules forcing changing of keys used to encrypt 
the data sent over the wireless network. Figure 1 presents the phase a,b,c. 
Both versions of WPA can work in two modes. The first is designed for home 
users and the second for institutions: 
WPA-PSK – that mode is designed for home users who do not have 
authentication server. The key used to authenticate at Access Point is statically 
kept on workstation. That key is used in the process of generating Primary 
Transient Key (used to encrypt the data sent between the workstation and the 
gateway), and Group Master Key (used to encrypt the data sent to broadcast) [2]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Protocol 802.11i phases 
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WPA-EAP – that mode is designed for institutions. For example in EAP-TLS 
every user of WLAN has its own key. Authentication is made by Radius server 
(Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service). Radius stores users’ keys. Access 
Point is Network Access Server (NAS) mediator between the authentication 
server (RADIUS) and the station (STA ) or more often called supplicant. That 
mode resolves the problem of one shared keys for the whole institution. When 
one key is stolen the only device using that key is compromised. Another 
connections use different keys and are secure [2]. 
During the first phase of connecting the supplier to the network both Supplier 
and authenticator need to negotiate policy used to authenticate. Policies served 
by authenticator are announced by Beacon parameter or replied in Probe respond 
communicate. Policy used to authenticate is located in IE (Information Element) 
RSN frame. It contains: 
– authentication served methods ( 802.11x, Pre-shared key), 
– security protocols for group and individual communication (CCMP, 
TKIP), 
– maintenance of preliminary authentication – supporting roaming of users 
between different access points. 
When the first phase ends Authenticator and supplier go into Four-way 
handshake to negotiate temporary keys used to encrypt data. Let us look at the 
four way handshake process. Understanding that process is important to find 
insecurity which can be used by intruder. 
The first step which is taken in the four-way handshake is for authenticator 
and supplicant to generate a nonce value. These values are random and different 
in every four-way handshake. Nonce value generated by authenticator is called 
Anonce. Nonce value generated by supplicant is called Snonce. After generating 
random value the authenticator starts the handshake process.  
 
First message sent in the handshake process 
Authenticator sent to the supplicant EAPOL-Key message containing 
Anonce. This message is not encrypted. Message is not secured against 
manipulation or change. If the attacker changes that message, the process of 
handshake falls down, that is why non protection is required. 
Supplicant after receiving that message has all information needed to 
compute temporal keys from PMK, its own Snonce, his MAC address, Anonce 
from authenticator, MAC address of authenticator [3]. 
 
Second message sent from supplicant to authenticator 
Authenticator can not compute temporal keys because he has no Snonce 
generated by supplicant. Unencrypted message sent from supplicant has Snonce 
in it. The second message sent to authenticator has protection which was not in 
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the first message. It contains MIC message integrity checksum. Supplicant has 
all keys needed to establish secure connection so it computes MIC of the second 
message and put it in it. MIC protects the second message against modifying by 
anyone. Secondly, MIC gives authenticator ability to check whether supplicant 
knows PMK. If the supplicant PMK’s does not match that of the authenticator, 
MIC generated for the second message will be different. Authenticator has got to 
receive the second message and take Snonce of supplicant from it. Authenticator 
can compute temporal keys. After that he goes back and check MIC generated 
by supplicant. When it is correct, it means that supplicant has the same PMK as 
authenticator [3]. 
 
Third message sent from Authenticator to supplicant 
Authenticator informs supplicant that he is ready to use new keys for 
encryption. It is important to synchronize operation of installing keys both on 
authenticator and supplicant. If one side turns on encryption before the second is 
ready, the established link will fall down. The third message includes MIC so 
supplicant can check whether authenticator has the same PMK key. The third 
message is also unencrypted and contains the sequence number (usually 0). That 
number is used to send the first encrypted message. That message is sent 
unencrypted until authenticator receives the fourth message. If the third message 
does not come to supplicant authenticator has got to resend that message that is 
why he does not install temporal keys [3]. 
 
Fourth message sent from supplicant to authenticator 
That message is also unencrypted. Supplicant receives the third message and 
sends information message to authenticator. That message ends the four way 
handshake process. After that message supplicant installs temporal keys. 
Authenticator receives the fourth message and also installs temporal keys [3]. 
Authenticator and Supplicant have ability to encrypt messages sent in the 
network. After that process Supplicant and authenticator negotiate in the 
encrypted messages GTK group temporally keys supporting encryption of 
multicast and broadcast messages.  
Temporary keys are destroyed when connection is closed by client or 
authenticator.  
 
4. Example of WPA-PSK attack 
Now we have theory, which can be used to perform the example attack on 
home WPA protected network using the dictionary Pre Shared key. The author 
of that attack is Richard Moskovitz.  
The first thing is to possess proper network device. Most important thing is 
that chipset of our client card has to support working card in the monitor mode. 
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Monitor mode is equivalent to promiscuous mode in wired networks. Secondly 
our platform is a Unix-like operating system. And thirdly our drivers support 
packet injection. Attack is based on collecting all data needed to compute 
Primary transient keys. Hacker collects the following data: Access point MAC 
address, access MAC address of connected client, Anonce generated by Access 
point, Snonce generated by client. Next, a word from the dictionary is taken and 
primary transient key is computed. Message integrity checksum is generated and 
is compared to MIC of the second message sent during the four-way handshake 
process. When MICs from the handshake process is the same as generated by 
program it means that the word used to compute keys is the pre-shared key. 
Currently corporate WLANs are properly secured. There are not known 
vulnerabilities of WPA-EAP – mode designed for institutions.  
More detailed phases of attack are: 
Discover the presence of wireless network 
First of all hacker has got to use his device to discover wireless networks. He 
can use kismet tool which shows all wireless networks. He needs to find on 
which channel WLAN works. Kismet is an open source tool. It can be 
downloaded from the internet. The process of installing is not difficult. It has 
also a graphical version called gkismet. 
Kismet or gkismet can be used to discover SSID and MAC addresses of 
authenticator and supplicant. We can use a kismet tool to show detailed 
information about Access point and their clients. 
The next step is to put wireless device in a monitor mode 
It can be done by command 
iwconfig interface monitor mode channel number_of_channel 
Prepare deauthentication packets. 
We can use an airforge tool to prepare a deauthentication packet. That tool is 
also an open source tool. If our Unix-like distribution does not have that tool in 
the standard commands, sources of that tool can be found in the internet and 
installed in our computer. 
Generation of packet can be done by the command 
 
airforge AP:MA:C_:AD:RE:SS  CL:MA:C_:AD:RE:SS 
name_of_deauthentication_packet 
 
Enable packets collecting program 
Before deauthentication packets are sent to the network program collecting all 
packets sent in the network should be enabled. There is very nice graphical tool 
called ethereal which can be used to do that. Ethereal is an open source tool and 
can be downloaded and installed in every Unix-like operating system. 
Packet injection  
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There are a few tools which can be used to inject packets to the wireless 
network. For example tools which can be used to do that are packet2air and 
aireplay. The latter will be used to inject packets to the wireless network. 
The command allowing us to send packets to the network looks like that 
presented below: 
 
aireplay –m 26 –u 3 –w 0 –x 1 –r name_of_deauthentication_packet 
 
Option: -m sets length of packet, -u specifies type of packet, -w turns on the 
use of WEP encryption or not, -x specifies a number of deauthentication packets 
sent per second 
Derivation of pre shared key 
Client card automatically tries to connect to the network after the process of 
deauthentication connected client. That is why we can collect all needed data to 
find pre-shared key. The open source tool which can be used to automatically 
find PSK is cowpatty. That tool uses dictionary pointed in the running command 
to check whether one of words from that dictionary is PSK.  
 
5. Time-consumption of decryption 
If our secret shared key is a dictionary word or simple 12345678 etc. chain it 
is not difficult to crack that password with a cowpatty tool. We have to know 
that the weaker and simpler the pre shared key is, the attack is shorter. We can 
ask how much time the process of brut force attack on the data collected in 
attack can take. Let us count how many possible sequences we can generate 
from the keyboard. The Number of different signs which can be typed from 
keyboard is 112 (without space bar – sometimes access point or client card 
rejects connections when the space bar is used in the pre shared key). The 
number of possible k – length subsequences put from the key board is given by 
the formula 
 KC=W ,  
where K is the length of sequence C is the number of subsequences generated 
from all signs which can be typed, W is the number of all signs which can be 
typed. 
Table 1 represents the number of possible subsequences, and the time which 
brut force attack can take. The number of seconds, minutes, hours, days is 
counted for the computer with four billion operations per second. 
Access point allows minimal eight signs length pre-shared keys and the 
maximum is 64 signs length PSK. 
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Table 1. Number of possible k length pre-shared keys and time which process  
of checking them can take 
K – length of 
subsequence 
Number of 
subsequences Seconds Minutes Hours Days 
7 2.21068E+14 55267.03519 921.1172531 15.35195422 0.639664759 
8 2.47596E+16 6189907.941 103165.1323 1719.418872 71.64245302 
9 2.77308E+18 693269689.4 11554494.82 192574.9137 8023.954738 
10 3.10585E+20 77646205209 1294103420 21568390.34 898682.9307 
11 3.47855E+22 8.69637E+12 1.4494E+11 2415659718 100652488.2 
12 3.89598E+24 9.73994E+14 1.62332E+13 2.70554E+11 11273078682 
13 4.36349E+26 1.09087E+17 1.81812E+15 3.0302E+13 1.26258E+12 
14 4.88711E+28 1.22178E+19 2.0363E+17 3.39383E+15 1.41409E+14 
15 5.47357E+30 1.36839E+21 2.28065E+19 3.80109E+17 1.58379E+16 
16 6.13039E+32 1.5326E+23 2.55433E+21 4.25722E+19 1.77384E+18 
17 6.86604E+34 1.71651E+25 2.86085E+23 4.76808E+21 1.9867E+20 
18 7.68997E+36 1.92249E+27 3.20415E+25 5.34025E+23 2.22511E+22 
19 8.61276E+38 2.15319E+29 3.58865E+27 5.98108E+25 2.49212E+24 
20 9.64629E+40 2.41157E+31 4.01929E+29 6.69881E+27 2.79117E+26 
 
6. Simple protections 
The first proposed protection is to generate non dictionary SSID and PSK for 
home users. Insecurities described in the previous part of the article base on 
guessing PSK. If PSK is one of commonly used words and is present in a 
hackers’ dictionary it is obvious that guessing it is not difficult. Many of us have 
to admit that it is difficult to generate a random sequence of signs by typing 
them on the keyboard. So one of the solutions of that problem is to use the 
program to generate PSK and SSID. After the process of generating them we can 
write that data on a writable compact disk and use it to set up our wireless 
devices. After the process of setting up devices we can destroy our secret data or 
keep it in a secure place and use to set up a new device. 
 
Conclusions 
Wireless networks are commonly used by a large group of people. While 
corporate mode using EAP-TLS or another method of authorization is very 
secure, home users have got to know about vulnerability which can be used to 
guess their pre-shared key. It is a very important thing to properly secure 
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WLANs using the pre-shared key mode. People using that mode have got to use 
keys which are less 20 signs long and are not based on words form dictionary. 
This article shows how the home mode of 802.11i standard works. It presents 
how the process of four-way handshake works. It describes process of the 
example attack.  
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